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We study the market’s reaction to Jim Cramer’s recommendations on the television show
Mad Money. Average abnormal overnight returns following his recommendations are over 3%
for the entire sample, and 6.7% for stocks in the smallest quintile. Using a novel dataset of
television viewership, we find that the price response is increasing in the number of wealthy
viewers who watch the show but unaffected by the number of low income households viewing
the recommendations. Consistent with theories of limits to arbitrage, we find that the overnight
return is strongest for stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility. Using data from an ECN, we show
that the market’s response to the recommendations is immediate even though the show airs after
the NYSE’s trading hours. These price spikes are followed by partial reversals, and short-selling
is significantly higher than normal on the day following the recommendations. Equity lending
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1 Introduction
We analyze the market’s reaction to first-time buy recommendations of Jim Cramer, host of the
CNBC show Mad Money. We find that the average overnight abnormal return following Cramer’s
recommendations exceeds 3%. This number is economically significant given that the average
overnight change in market capitalization following his recommendation is $56 million.1 There
are significant cross-sectional differences in these abnormal overnight returns: the price reaction is
strongest for stocks with smaller market capitalization, stocks featured in his “discussion” section of
the show and stocks with no other news surrounding the recommendation. Using proprietary data
from Nielsen Media Research, we also find that the level of wealthy viewership is strongly related
to the market response.
These price spikes occur immediately even though the recommendations are not publicly
observed during market hours. Using data from an Electronic Communication Network (ECN), we
find unusually high trading volume and returns during the hour of the show’s airing. Although
the show is usually taped before it airs,2 we find no price response during the time of its taping.3
The price spikes are followed by partial reversals. Cumulative abnormal returns are significantly
negative when the event time is set as the end of the trading day following Cramer’s recommendation,
especially for stocks with no other news. For example, stocks in which Cramer’s recommendation
was the only news about the company experience an average abnormal overnight return of 3.8%,
but after 50 days, the cumulative abnormal returns for these stocks falls to 1.1%. We also find little
evidence that Cramer has skill in selecting stocks, so it is unclear why the market responds at all
to his recommendations.
Our findings contribute to several literatures. First, a fundamental issue in asset pricing is
how public information is incorporated into prices. As the evidence mounts against the semi-strong
form of market efficiency as defined by Fama (1970), several authors have begun to examine whether
the response of asset prices to public information is related to how many traders observe that public
information. For example, Hong and Stein (1999) build a model in which information diffuses slowly
into prices as “newswatchers” slowly acquire information. Huberman and Regev (2001) document
the case of cancer drug company EntreMed whose stock price tripled based on a favorable front-page
article in the New York Times in May of 1998 even though all the information in the article had been
released five months earlier in the journal Nature (and in other press reports). Using a larger sample,
Tetlock (2008) also finds differential return patterns based on whether news stories are repeated in
the media. DellaVigna and Pollet (2008) find a weaker response to earnings announcements on
Fridays when presumably fewer traders are present. A shortcoming in all of these papers is the
identification strategy. Although the papers infer that asset prices around information events are
1This computation is based on abnormal returns, which are defined as the stock’s returned minus it’s Fama-French
matched portfolio. See Section 2 for more details on the matching methodology.
2Occasionally the show airs live. For example, as part of his Back to School college tours, Cramer visited the
campuses of several universities and taped the 6 p.m. show in front of a live studio audience.
3However, Forbes documents one case in which a caller to the show overheard a Cramer recommendation
for Syneron Medical and posted the information on a Yahoo message board before the show aired. See
http://www.forbes.com/home/management/2005/08/18/cramer-cnbc-madmoney-cz pl 0819cramer.html.
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partially determined by the number of traders who observe the events, none of these papers can
directly measure how many traders observe the public information. Authors of earlier studies use
proxies for this attention, including trading volume (e.g. Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001),
Barber and Odean (2008), and Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2008)), the existence of news (Barber and
Odean (2008)), firms’ advertising expenses (Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004)), extreme returns
(Barber and Odean (2008)) and up/down markets (Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2008)). While each
of these measures may be related to attention, they also capture other effects. For example, the
most popular measure of attention – trading volume – is also a popular measure of disagreement
in the literature (Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001)). Our paper is different. Because Mad Money is
on television, we can measure the TV viewership which witnesses these recommendation events and
draw a direct link between the number of traders who observe the event and the consequence for
asset prices. As expected, we find a positive relationship between total viewership and overnight
return. Moreover, it not only matters how many people are exposed to the recommendations, but
the types of people that are exposed to the recommendations. When we divide the total viewership
by wealth we find a strong positive relationship between wealthy viewership and overnight return,
but no relationship between low income viewership and overnight return. A one standard deviation
increase in the number of wealthy households watching the show increases abnormal overnight
returns by over 80 basis points. Our results suggest that the link between the exposure of public
information and the market response may be more complex than previously thought. In particular,
the results suggest that who observes an event may be just as important as how many do.
Second, our setting is ideal for testing whether limits to arbitrage arise when stocks deviate
from their fundamental values. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) posit that arbitrageurs are limited in
their ability to correct mispricing because prices may diverge even further from fundamental value
in the short run, possibly forcing the arbitrageur to liquidate his position at a loss. Assuming the
price-reversal pattern we document represents prices temporarily deviating and then returning to
fundamental value, we can test Shleifer and Vishny (1997) by examining the relationship between a
stock’s idiosyncratic volatility and its overnight returns following Cramer’s recommendation. Con-
sistent with their theory, we find that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility exhibit the highest
overnight returns following Cramer’s recommendations.
Short-sale constraints are another potential limit to arbitrage. If an arbitrageur believes a
stock is trading above its fundamental value and he does not already own the stock, he must borrow
shares in order to sell the stock. Such borrowing can be costly, especially when there is a lot of
demand for borrowing. If short-sale constraints are an insignificant limit to arbitrage, these costs
should be unrelated to the level of mispricing. If, however, these costs limit arbitrageurs’ ability to
correct mispricing, we should expect the short-selling costs to be highest when the stocks deviate
furthest from fundamental value. Consistent with the limit to arbitrage prediction, we find that
increases in short-selling costs around Cramer’s recommendations are significantly related to the
overnight returns following the recommendations. That is, the stocks with the highest overnight
returns tend to be the stocks that are most expensive to short, controlling for size and other controls.
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Finally, there is a large literature examining stock returns following non-analyst media recom-
mendations. See, for example, Barber and Loeffler (1993) and Liu, Smith, and Syed (1990). Like us,
these authors document a price spike and partial reversal following the recommendations. We con-
tribute to this literature by examining whether contemporaneous news announcements mitigate the
effects of the recommendation. Controlling for contemporaneous news is important because if the
recommendations are based on recent news about the companies, it is unclear whether the market
is responding to the recommendations themselves or the news that caused the person to issue the
recommendation. We create a news dummy to indicate whether the company had news (other than
the recommendation) in the three-day window surrounding the recommendation. We find that the
reversals are strongest when there is no news about the company surrounding the recommendation
period. That is, when we can isolate the recommendation as the only information event, we find an
even stronger pattern of spike/reversal. In our regression analysis, we find that this fact is largely
due to the positive correlation between size and the likelihood of news coverage (Chan (2003), Vega
(2006), Fang and Peress (2008), Engelberg (2008), Tetlock (2008)). After controlling for size, we
find that the effect of other news on the overnight return response is statistically insignificant.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe Mad Money and some basic
characteristics of the stocks Cramer tends to recommend. In Section 3 we provide evidence that
Cramer’s recommendations are followed by significant overnight returns and we run regressions to
see which types of recommendations generate the highest overnight returns. We show that the
price response is immediate by analyzing after-hours trading in Section 3.1, and we show that the
initial spike is followed by reversals in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3 we analyze whether Cramer has
skill at selecting stocks, and in Section 3.4 we investigate the short-selling costs following Cramer’s
recommendations. Section 4 concludes.
2 Data
Mad Money is a popular financial television show that airs every weekday evening on CNBC. Its
host, Jim Cramer, is a former hedge fund manager who has been described by the popular press
as “hyperactive,” “hyperkinetic,” “bellowing,” “blustery” and that “he resembles a cross between
a pro wrestler and an air traffic controller.”4 During each episode, Cramer provides stock recom-
mendations to the sound of bulls roaring, cash registers ringing, bowling pins crashing and a slew
of other sound effects.
Our recommendation data consist of the 391 first time buy recommendations made by Jim
Cramer on his television show Mad Money between November 16, 2005 and June 23, 2006.5 These
391 recommendations are taken from two websites that track Cramer’s recommendations: Your-
MoneyWatch.com and TheStreet.com. YourMoneyWatch.com is unaffiliated with Cramer or CNBC,
4Sources: Houston Chronicle (July 7, 2005), Boston Herald (February 1, 2006), and Time Magazine (August 15,
2005).
5Our sample is restricted to these dates because they are the only dates for which we have both viewership data
and short-selling data.
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whereas TheStreet.com is affiliated with Cramer, sells Cramer and Mad Money-related products,
and posts the prior two months of Cramer’s recommendations. There is some disagreement between
these two sites, and we restrict attention to the recommendations that appear on both websites.6
We are able to match 388 of the 391 recommendations to CRSP and Compustat. We divide
his picks into size and book-to-market quintiles based on NYSE cutoff values. The size of each
stock is computed at the end of June, and the book-to-market at date t is defined as BEmarket , where
BE is total assets minus total liabilities and preferred stock plus deferred taxes and convertible
debt computed at the end of the latest fiscal year ending before the latest June preceeding date
t, and “market” is defined as the size of the company in the December preceeding the latest June
preceeding date t.7 Of the 388 recommendations that can be matched to CRSP and Compustat, 351
are ordinary common shares (excluding Americus Trust Components, closed-end funds, and REITs).
Of these 351 stocks, 333 an be matched to a size and book-to-market portfolio.8 We present the
distribution of his recommendation by quintiles in Table 1.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
We conclude from Table 1 that Cramer has a preference for small growth stocks. There are
more picks in the small growth portfolio (39) than in any other, over one third of his recommendations
fall in the extreme growth quintile, and nearly a third of his recommendations are in the smallest
quintile.
We next examine his distribution of picks by momentum deciles to get a sense of whether he
favors momentum strategies or contrarian ones. Every month, we compute the cumulative return
over the previous twelve months for every stock in the CRSP database that month with at least
6 previous monthly returns. We then sort the stocks into deciles based on their previous annual
return.9
Cramer has a tendency of recommending stocks that have done well over the prior twelve
months: The distribution of his picks by momentum decile is shown in Table 2.10
6The disagreement probably arises because of the subjective nature of deciding what constitutes a buy recommen-
dation. For example, Cramer sometimes gives conditional recommendations (e.g. “wait three days, then buy”) or uses
noncommittal language (e.g. “I like the stock”). Of the two major websites that track Cramer’s recommendations,
YourMoneyWatch.com appears to have the stricter standard of what constitutes a buy recommendation. A description
of their criteria can be found at:
http://yourmoneywatch.com/index.php?name=Home&op=show buffer&type=methodology.
We are not concerned by the disagreement between the sites because our results are qualitatively similar when we
expand the sample to include all of the stocks that appear on TheStreet.com, the site with the less stringent standards.
7Compustat items 6, 181, 10, 35, and 79 are used to compute BE.
8The other 18 stocks were not old enough to be assigned to a size and book-to-market portfolio.
9More specifically, if Cramer recommends a stock in month t, we compute the stock’s cumulative return from month
t− 12 through month t− 1 and rank it relative to the other stocks in the CRSP database.
10There are two types of recommendations issued by Cramer–“discussion segment” picks and “lightning round”
picks. Since the latter are largely determined by his viewers, the reader might question whether the lightning round
recommendations drive this finding. This is not the case–a plurality of his recommendations lie in the winners’ decile
whether the sample is restricted to lightning round recommendations or discussion segment recommendations.
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[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
3 Market Reaction to Cramer’s Recommendations
We begin by analyzing the overnight returns following Cramer’s recommendations. We define the
overnight return as
open pricet+1 − closing pricet
closing pricet
,
where t is the day of Cramer’s recommendation, and t+1 is the first trading day following the recom-
mendation. Two of the stocks have missing opening prices on the day following his recommendation,
leaving us with a sample of 331 overnight returns.
We define a stock’s overnight abnormal return as the difference between its overnight return
and the average of all stocks in the CRSP database in the stock’s size and book-to-market quintile.
Since Mad Money airs at 6:00 PM ET, the recommendations are not made public until after the
market closes on the day it is recommended. Hence, the average overnight abnormal return is a mea-
sure of the market’s reaction to Cramer’s recommendation. Table 3 contains the average overnight
abnormal return following Cramer’s recommendations, by size and book-to-market portfolio. Since
small stocks are generally less liquid than large stocks, we expect the average overnight abnormal
returns to be highest for stocks in the small portfolio.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
The average overnight abnormal return across all 331 stocks is 3.38%. As predicted, the
average overnight abnormal returns are highest for the small stocks that Cramer recommends.
Among all twenty five portfolios, the abnormal overnight returns are highest for the small growth
picks (8.02%). These are also the stocks that Cramer is most prone to recommend (see Table 1).
The size effect is much stronger than the book-to-market effect: the difference between the average
abnormal overnight returns between stocks in the smallest quintile and stocks in the largest quintile
is 6.02% (6.69% - .67%), while the difference is only 1.11% between the growth quintile and the
value quintile (3.93% - 2.82%).







where rt is the stock return on day t and Volumet is the dollar volume on day t. The average is
calculated over all positive-volume days from days -34 to -5 (inclusive). We predict that stocks with
high ILLIQUIDITY will have high abnormal overnight returns following Cramer’s recommendations.
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In Sections 3.2 and 3.4, we show that the overnight spikes in prices following Cramer’s rec-
ommendations are accompanied by an unusually high volume of short-selling and are followed by
partial reversals. This suggests that the initial price spike is temporary mispricing rather than the
market rationally updating its valuation in response to news of Cramer’s recommendation, and that
some market participants are aware of this temporary mispricing. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue
that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility are riskier to arbitrage and are therefore less attractive
to arbitrageurs. We test this theory by defining the variable IDIOVOL as the standard deviation
of the abnormal daily returns from days -34 through -5, where day 0 represents the day of the rec-
ommendation. As before, abnormal returns are defined as the difference between the stock’s return
and its matched portfolio’s return, where the matching is based on size and book-to-market. We
predict that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility will exhibit higher average overnight returns
because arbitrageurs are less likely to correct mispricing in high IDIOVOL stocks.
We test our hypotheses by estimating the following model for log abnormal overnight returns
(AOR):
log (1 + AOR) = α+ βsize SIZE + βilliquidity ILLIQUIDITY + βidiovol IDIOVOL + ε, (2)
where LOG SIZE is a liquidity measure defined as the natural log of the stock’s market cap at the
close of the recommendation day, ILLIQUIDITY is the illiquidity measure as defined by Amihud
(2002), and IDIOVOL is the stock’s idiosyncratic volatility. We hypothesize that βsize < 0 and
βilliquidity > 0 due to liquidity and that βidiovol > 0 because it represents a limit to arbitrage.
The regression results are presented in Column 1 of Table 5. The coefficient of SIZE is
significantly negative, and the coefficients of illiquidity and IDIOVOL are significantly positive, as
predicted.
The positive coefficient of IDIOVOL is evidence that idiosyncratic volatility hinders arbi-
trageurs from keeping prices close to fundamental value, as predicted by Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
Previous researchers have found evidence supporting Shleifer and Vishny (1997) by investigating
the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility (as measured by the CAPM) and various anoma-
lies, including post-earnings announcement drift (Mendenhall (2004)), the book-to-market effect
(Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003)), and the accrual anomaly (Mashruwala, Rajgopal, and Shevlin
(2006)). In particular, they show that the aforementioned anomalies are most pronounced among
stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility. To the extent that the CAPM is a valid asset pricing model,
these results suggest that idiosyncratic risk is a limit to arbitrage. However, Choi (2009) provides
evidence that even the Fama and French (1993) three factor model omits risk factors, and that stocks
with high idiosyncratic volatility (relative to the Fama and French (1993) 3 factor model) load on
these factors. Hence, the results from previous studies comparing return anomalies and idiosyncratic
volatility might be driven by loadings on omitted risk factors. Assuming the spike-reversal pattern
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we document is not driven by loadings on omitted risk factors, our evidence supporting Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) is immune from the omitted risk factor critique.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
It is not obvious that the overnight returns we observe are entirely driven by Cramer’s rec-
ommendations. It is conceivable that Cramer bases his recommendation on current news, and that
the price spikes we observe are caused by the market reacting to this news rather than to Cramer’s
recommendation. To test whether this is driving our results, we search Factiva for any news article
about the stock on the trading day before Cramer’s recommendation, on the day of the recom-
mendation, or on the day after the recommendation. We used a combination of company name,
ticker, and Factiva company code to to identify firms in articles. We exclude articles in which the
stock was mentioned in a table (e.g. a table of mutual fund holdings or a table of the day’s highest
volume stocks) and exclude articles in which Cramer’s recommendation was the news event in the
article. The dummy variable NEWS takes the value 1 if there is a news article during that three
day window. Therefore, the NEWS variable identifies the observations that had news unrelated to
Cramer’s recommendation.
Column 2 of Table 5 presents the regression results of the following model for log abnormal
overnight returns:
log (1 + AOR) = α+ βsize SIZE + βilliquidity ILLIQUIDITY + βidiovol IDIOVOL + βnews NEWS + ε. (3)
We include SIZE, ILLIQUIDITY, and IDIOVOL in all of our regressions because we believe they
affect how well the market can accomodate the buying pressure exerted by Mad Money viewers.
The coefficient on NEWS is insignificant, supporting our assertion that the overnight returns
we observe are driven by his recommendation rather than simultaneous news events. We will see
in Section 3.1 that the returns are concentrated during the hour Mad Money airs, which further
supports our view that his recommendations cause the price spikes we observe.
We now begin analyzing factors affecting the amount of buying pressure exerted by Mad
Money viewers. A unique feature of our setting relative to the others in the literature is that we can
accurately measure how many people are exposed to the recommendations, as well as what types of
people are exposed to the recommendations using data from Nielsen Media Research.
Nielsen Media Research is a firm that specializes in audience measurement. They estimate
the number of people who view each television show each day, as well as the demographics (e.g.,
age, wealth, race, education, etc.) of the viewers for each show each day. Since Mad Money airs
three times each weekday–first at 6 PM ET with reruns at 9 PM and midnight–we have several
options for our measure of the number of viewers exposed to his recommendations. We restrict our
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attention to the 6 PM viewership.11 The mean viewership for the 6 PM showings among the 123
episodes in our sample is 213,000, with values ranging from 73,000 to 304,000 (σ = 44, 000).
Because stock market participation is heavily concentrated among the wealthiest individuals
(see, e.g., Table 6 in Vissing-Jørgensen (2003)), we expect the number of high income viewers to be
an important factor in explaining the level of overnight abnormal returns following Cramer’s recom-
mendations. Defining wealthy viewers as those with household income above $60,000, the average
number of high income households viewing Mad Money during our sample is 140,940 households
with a standard deviation of 33,940.12
We estimate the following model of abnormal overnight returns in Column 3 of Table 5:
log (1 + AOR) = α+ βsize SIZE + βilliquidity ILLIQUIDITY + βidiovol IDIOVOL
+βhigh HIGH INC VIEWERSHIP + βlow LOW INC VIEWERSHIP + ε. (4)
As predicted, the coefficient βhigh is positive, while the coefficient βlow is insignificant. The
positive relationship between wealthy viewership and abnormal overnight returns is economically
significant. A one standard deviation increase in HIGH INC VIWERSHIP increases abnormal
overnight returns by over 80 basis points when all other variables are set to their means.13 In
contrast, we find no evidence of a relationship between the number of low income individuals exposed
to the recommendations and abnormal overnight returns.
We expect three other factors to affect the magnitude of buying pressure following Cramer’s
recommendations. First, Cramer’s discussion segment picks should generate more buying pressure
than his lightning round picks. Cramer uses the discussion segment to recommend stocks that he
finds particularly attractive. These recommendations are usually accompanied by detailed descrip-
tions of the company’s business and his reasons for believing the stock is a good buy. In contrast,
the stocks discussed during the lightning round are chosen by viewers of the show, and Cramer’s
lightning round buy recommendations are generally accompanied by much less justification than his
discussion segment picks.
We also expect the number of recommendations Cramer issues alongside the recommendation
to impact buying pressure. For example, if Cramer only recommends one stock during an episode,
every viewer choosing to follow Cramer’s advice will buy that one stock. However, if he recommends
five stocks, some viewers will likely only invest in a subset of the recommendations, whereas others
will invest in a different subset of the recommendations. This leads us to hypothesize that overnight
abnormal returns are highest for stocks that are recommended on days when there are few competing
recommendations.
11We choose this measure in part because the market prices are already significantly affected by 7 PM. See Section 3.1
12We define wealthy households as those earning more than $60,000 because the median income for a four person
family in the United States is $62,732. (Source: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/4person.html )
13For this calculation we use the model in Column 5, which includes all of the variables used in our regressions.
9
Finally, we include a variable capturing stock’s momentum decile based on the prior twelve
months’ returns. It remains an open question whether investors are more likely to believe in mean
reverting or trending stock returns because the existing evidence is mixed. De Bondt (1991) analyzes
economic forecasters’ responses to the Livingston survey and find strong evidence that their pre-
dictions are mean-reverting. However, in a later study De Bondt (1993) analyzed survey responses
of non-experts and found evidence consistent with investor belief in continuation of trends in stock
prices. Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003) find that individual investors are more likely to be net
purchasers of the worst performing stocks than of the best performing stocks, suggesting that indi-
vidual investors are more likely to believe in mean reversion of stock returns than are institutional
investors.
We estimate the following model:
log (1 + AOR) = α+ βsize SIZE + βilliquidity ILLIQUIDITY + βidiovol IDIOVOL
+βlightround LIGHTROUND + βnum NUM PICKS
+βdecile MOMENTUM DECILE + ε. (5)
The results are shown in Column 4 of Table 5. LIGHTROUND is a dummy for whether the
pick was given during the lightning round. NUM PICKS is defined as the number of discussion
segment picks (excluding the recommendation under consideration) that were made on the day
of the recommendation. MOMENTUM DECILE is calculated by ranking the stocks’ previous 12
month returns across all stocks in the CRSP universe. Decile 0 (9) contains the extreme losers
(winners).
The coefficient of LIGHTROUND is significantly negative, consistent with our prediction that
prices rise more following Cramer’s discussion segment picks than for his lightning round picks.
The coefficient on NUM PICKS is also significantly negative, confirming our prediction that
the price response tends to be stronger when the recommendation is accompanied by fewer other
recommendations. This is similar to a recent finding by Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2007), who
analyze how the market’s reaction to companies’ earnings announcements is affected by the number
of other companies that announce earnings on the same day. They find that the price and vol-
ume reaction to earnings announcements are weaker, and that post earnings announcement drift is
stronger, when many other companies announce earnings on the same day.
The coefficient on MOMENTUM DECILE is significantly negative, suggesting that viewers
are more likely to act on Cramer’s contrarian picks than his momentum picks. This result seems
related to the finding by Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003) that individual investors are more
likely to be net buyers of poorly performing stocks than of well performing stocks. Moreover, it
supports the notion that individual investors believe that stock returns mean revert.
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Column 5 of Table 5 contains the results of the regression including all of the independent
variables. The signs of all the variables are the same in the reduced models as in the full model, and
the statistical significance of the variables is qualitatively similar for all of the variables. In Columns 6
and 7 we restrict the sample to the set of all discussion segment picks and lightning round picks,
respectively.14 We see that the model works much better at explaining the abnormal overnight
returns for the discussion segment picks than the lightning round picks: statistical significance is
greater for all of the coefficients in the discussion segment sample (including the intercept), and the
R2 is also higher. All of this suggests that viewers are more likely to act on Cramer’s discussion
segment recommendations than his lightning round ones.
3.1 Speed of the Market’s Response
We have already seen that Cramer’s recommendations are followed by statistically and economically
significant overnight returns, particularly among small stocks (see Table 3). These overnight returns
are based on the opening price the day following the recommendation and the closing price the day
of the recommendation. The recommendations are made between these times.15 We now turn our
attention to the timing of the market’s response to the news. Three scenarios are possible. First,
prices might rise and trading volume might be high before Cramer issues his recommendations. Since
Cramer’s recommendations have a predictable impact on market prices, insiders who are aware of
the recommendations (e.g. the film crew) have an incentive to trade on this information. Also, if
Cramer recommends stocks based on recent news events, it’s possible that the returns are driven by
the underlying news event, and not the recommendations themselves. Another possibility is that
the market is slow to respond to Cramer’s recommendations. If this were true, one could easily
profit from the recommendations by buying the stocks in the after hours market as soon as they are
made public. The final possibility is that the market reacts to the information as soon as they are
made public and that immediate, short-run returns are unpredictable.
To determine which of these scenarios are true, we obtain after-hours transactions from an
ECN. Our data are from NASDAQ’s historical Totalview-ITCH which records all orders and ex-
ecutions on the NASDAQ system for securities listed on NASDAQ, NYSE, AMEX and regional
exchanges.16 It also includes orders and executions over INET - the Instinet Group’s ECN that
NASDAQ acquired in December of 2005. The ECN orders and executions are particularly relevant
for our study since Cramer’s recommendations are made after hours.
We display the average returns in the after hours of the days of Cramer’s recommendations
in the top half of Figure 1. The price at each time (in multiples of 30 minutes) is defined as the
price of the last trade on the ECN prior to that time. The base price for the return calculations is
the price of the last trade on the ECN prior to the 6 PM start of Mad Money. The price response
occurs during the hour Mad Money airs–from 6 to 7. Before 6, the price run-up is economically
14We do not include LIGHTROUND since its value does not vary within these samples.
15Mad Money airs from 6 to 7 PM ET.
16http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/Trader.aspx?id=ITCH
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insignificant and barely statistically significant.17
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Recall from Table 5 that there are cross-sectional differences in the overnight returns of
Cramer’s recommendations. For example, the overnight return is significantly higher for small
stocks than large stocks, and for discussion segment recommendations than for lightning round rec-
ommendations. If these differences in returns do not arise immediately, one could profitably exploit
the differences by buying the stocks with relatively high overnight returns (e.g., small stocks) in the
after-hours market and selling the stocks with relatively low overnight returns (e.g., large stocks).
In the bottom half of Figure 1, the after hours returns are plotted by size quintile. During the hour
the show airs, the returns are much higher for the smallest stocks than the largest ones.
In the top half of Figure 2, we show that the price spike is larger for firms with no news
in the 3 day window surrounding the recommendation date than it is for firms with news. Since
NEWS is insignificant in the regressions in Table 5, this result is likely driven by the positive
correlation between NEWS and SIZE (ρ = .275). In the bottom half of Figure 2, we divide the
stocks by recommendation type–lightning round or discussion segment. Recall that Cramer spends
more time justifying his discussion segment and that these recommendations are associated with
larger overnight abnormal returns (Table 5).
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
Our findings suggest the cross-sectional differences in overnight returns arise within the hour
the show airs. Moreover, our findings that the price spikes occur during the hour Mad Money airs
and that the spikes are larger for the stocks without simultaneous news events imply that Cramer’s
recommendations, rather than contemporaneous news events, are the primary cause of the price
spikes we document.
We arrive at similar conclusions by examining trading volume in the after hours market.
Figure 3 displays the recommended stock’s turnover on the ECN (scaled by 1000) during each
30 minute interval. There is scant evidence of abnormal trading volume before the show’s airing
but clear evidence of abnormal trading volume during the show’s airing. Trading volume remains
unusually high following the show’s airing even though prices remain flat.18
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
17The upper bound for the confidence interval at 4:30 is -.04%.
18Recall that the show airs between 6:00 and 7:00.
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3.2 Longer Horizon Impact of Cramer’s Recommendations
We have shown that Cramer’s recommendations are followed by significant abnormal returns, and
that these returns occur immediately following the recommendations. We now examine whether the
price impact is persistent or transitory.
We plot the cumulative abnormal returns in event time in Figures 4 and 5. Abnormal returns
are computed by taking the difference between the stock’s daily return and the average daily return
of the stock’s matched portfolio, where the matching is done based on size and book-to-market
quintiles. The event is Cramer’s recommendation, and time is measured in trading days, where
day 0 corresponds to the day of the recommendation. The 95% confidence interval is obtained via
bootstrap sampling (10,000 replications).
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
The price spikes induced by Cramer’s recommendations are followed by partial reversals.
The cumulative abnormal returns drop below 2% nineteen days after the recommendation, down
from a high of over 3% two days after the recommendation.19 The spike-reversal pattern is most
pronounced for the smallest quintile of stocks: the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval for
the average abnormal return after one day–4.9%–is larger than the upper bound for the cumulative
abnormal returns after 30 days–4.7%. Hence, in our sample the strategy of shorting the smallest
stocks recommended by Cramer after he recommends them and buying the shares back thirty days
later is profitable with high statistical significance. This profit–more than 4.6% over thirty trading
days–is also economically significant.
We predict the spike-reversal pattern to be stronger among the recommendations with no
concurrent news events than for the recommendations with concurrent news events. To test this,
we compare the cumulative abnormal returns of the recommendations with news events during the
three day window surrounding the recommendation with the recommendations without news events
in the three day window surrounding the recommendation. We confirm this prediction in Figure 5.
Indeed, among the stocks with news events, the cumulative abnormal return after 50 days is actually
higher than the cumulative abnormal returns after 1 day (2.7% versus 2.0%), whereas the cumulative
abnormal returns drop to 1.1% from 3.8% for the recommendations without news events.
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE]
In Figure 6 we plot daily turnover in event time. His effect on trading volume is short-lived
compared to his effect on stock prices.
19In an earlier version of this paper, we documented a complete reversal following the recommendations. The
difference is due to a change in our methodology. Before, we used a four factor model to compute the benchmark
returns. Since Cramer’s recommendations tend to be momentum picks, they generally had high α’s in our pre-event
estimation window. We were then essentially subtracting away this (often positive) α in the post-event window, leading
to an overestimation of the reversal.
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[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE]
3.3 Should the Market React to Cramer’s Recommendations?
We have shown that Cramer’s buy recommendations are followed by abnormal positive returns and
high levels of trading volume. This begs the question of whether Cramer has skill at identifying
mispriced stocks. If he has such skill, the abnormal returns following his recommendations might
be consistent with the market rationally incorporating the news of the recommendation into the
stocks’ prices. Because the price spikes following his recommendations are followed by reversals,
we hypothesize that this is not the case. That is, we hypothesize that trading strategies based on
Cramer’s buy recommendations do not yield positive alphas.
To test this hypothesis we analyze the performance of various portfolios that follow Cramer’s
advice. In Table 6 we consider portfolios composed of stocks from our entire sample. Because we
are only interested in Cramer’s effect on prices, we also consider stocks with no other news events
surrounding the recommendation in Table 7. We consider strategies that wait 0/1 trading days
before buying and that hold for 50/100/250 trading days. We then compute monthly returns from
these calendar-time portfolios and regress these monthly returns on the Fama-French factors and a
momentum factor.
[INSERT TABLES 6 AND 7 HERE]
Strategies that buy one day after Cramer’s recommendation have negative alpha. For example,
a strategy which buys stocks with no other news one day after the recommendation and holds them
for 50 trading days has an alpha of -110 basis points per month. When we consider portfolios that
are formed on the day of the recommendation, we find a positive alpha that shrinks over the holding
period as the benefit from the initial spike becomes less significant to the trading strategy.20 In
all of these specifications, even when we include the price spike, we find no statistically detectable
positive alpha, although this may be due to the fact that we have a short time series.
3.4 Short Selling
Since Cramer’s recommendations are followed by a spike-reversal pattern, the strategy of shorting
the recommended stock after the recommendation and buying it back later is profitable. Moreover,
in Section 3.3 we showed that there is little evidence that Cramer has stock picking ability. Hence, we
predict that some traders are aware of Cramer’s effect on prices and that they short the recommended
stocks following his recommendation.
20This strategy cannot be implemented by viewers because it is based on future information–the recommendation,
which does not occur until after the market closes. Nevertheless, we compute the alpha because it is a measure of
Cramer’s skill that is not biased against him (since it does not assume the stocks are bought after the initial price
spike).
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To test this, we compute the volume of short selling using NYSE’s Reg SHO database. Of
Cramer’s 391 recommendations, we were able to match 206 of them to the Reg SHO database. Of
these, 175 are ordinary common shares. We restrict attention to these 175 stocks.
We plot the short selling volume in event time in the top half of Figure 7. The vertical axis
represents “short turnover,” defined as short sale volume divided by shares outstanding (multiplied
by 1,000). Time is measured in trading days, and day 0 is the day of the recommendation.
[INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE]
A clear pattern emerges. As predicted, there is a significant increase in short turnover on the
day after Cramer’s recommendation. The mean short turnover rises from 2.5 to 4.2 from day 0 to
day 1. The lower bound of the 95% confidence interval on day 1, 3.5, is higher than the upper bound
on day 0, 3.0.
Moreover, because the spike-reversal pattern is most evident in stocks that do not have news
releases around the time of Cramer’s recommendation (see Figure 5), we predict that the increase
in short selling should be most pronounced for stocks without news releases. This is confirmed in
the bottom panel of Figure 7, where we divide the sample based on whether the stock had a news
release in the 3 days surrounding the recommendation. The amount of short volume in the two
samples is similar before the recommendation causes them to diverge.
Earlier in our analysis we showed that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility have lower
abnormal overnight returns following Cramer’s recommendations. Our explanation for this finding
is that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility are riskier to arbitrage, and institutional traders
are less likely to short these stocks following his recommendations for this reason. Another factor
affecting institutions’ willingness to short is the cost of shorting as measured by the difference
between the federal funds rate and the rebate rate. (The rebate rate is the interest rate paid on the
collateral posted by the short seller when borrowing the shares to sell.) We predict that there will
be a significant increase in the demand for borrowing the stocks recommended by Cramer with high
abnormal overnight returns, and that this demand will increase the costs of shorting the stocks. We
also hypothesize that this effect will be less strong for stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility since
these stocks are less attractive to arbitrageurs.
To test these hypotheses we obtain equity lending data from a data provider that is both
a market maker in the equity loan market and a data provider for major equity lenders. See
Kolasinski, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2008) for a more detailed description of the equity lending
data. For every stock on every day, the lending database reports the weighted average rebate rate
calculated from the loan portfolios of 12 lenders. We define a variable called Specialness as the
difference between the federal funds rate and the weighted average rebate rate. As Reed (2007)
argues, “This measure of specialness represents scarcity in the equity loan market on a daily basis.”
To quantify the change in specialness around the recommendation event, we define a variable called
SPECIALNESS CHANGE which is the average specialness in the 10 days before the recommendation
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minus the average specialness in the 10 days after the recommendation. This variable is defined
(non-missing before and after the recommendation event) for 303 of our 388 recommendations.
In Column Table 8 we present the results of the following regression:
SPECIALNESS CHANGE = α+ βovernightOVERNIGHT RETURN + ε.
βovernight is significantly positive, confirming our prediction. In column 2 we test the hypothesis
that the increase in borrowing costs is lower for stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility by running
the following regression:
SPECIALNESS CHANGE = α+ βovernightOVERNIGHT RETURN + βidiovolIDIOVOL + ε.
As expected, the coefficient on IDIOVOL is significantly negative. This evidence supports the
notion that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility are perceived as being riskier for arbitrageurs
and is yet another piece of evidence in support of Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
The regression results presented in Column 4 suggest that the effect of OVERNIGHT RE-
TURN on SPECIALNESS CHANGE is nonlinear, with the relationship being most pronounced for
stocks that have the highest abnormal overnight returns (RETURN QUINTILE 5).
Finally, Columns 3 and 5 present the coefficient estimates when all of the variables used in
Table 5 are included.
4 Conclusion
We showed that Jim Cramer influences market prices through his recommendations on the show
Mad Money. We found that overnight returns following his recommendations are highest for small
stocks, stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility, stocks recommended on days when wealthy viewer-
ship is high, stocks that have performed relatively poorly over the previous twelve months, stocks
recommended on days when relatively few recommendations are issued, and stocks recommended
during the discussion segment (as opposed to the lightning round). Although the show airs after
NYSE trading hours, prices respond immediately in the after hours market. We examined the
trading profits one would earn by following Cramer’s advice, and we found no evidence that such
strategies earn positive alpha. Finally, since short selling is significantly higher than usual on the
day following Cramer’s recommendations, we concluded that some market participants profit from
the spike-reversal phenomenon that follows his recommendations. These arbitrageurs do not push
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Table 1: Distribution of Cramer’s Recommendations by Size and BM Quintiles
(growth) (value)
Size / BM 1 2 3 4 5 sum
(small) 1 39 24 20 15 11 109
2 23 11 10 10 4 58
3 19 12 6 9 5 51
4 19 10 8 5 2 44
(big) 5 28 15 9 7 12 71
sum 128 72 53 46 34 333
Table 1: We report the distribution of Cramer’s recommendations among the twenty-five size and book-
to-market portfolios. The sample size, 333, represents the number of his recommendations that could be
matched to one of the twenty-five portfolios.
Table 2: Distribution of Cramer’s Recommendations by Momentum Decile
Decile Lightning Round Discussion Segment Total
(Losers) 0 2 9 11
1 6 25 31
2 7 18 25
3 7 22 29
4 7 17 24
5 8 18 26
6 16 21 37
7 11 34 45
8 26 49 75
(Winners) 9 33 52 85
123 265 388
Table 2: We report the distribution of Cramer’s picks by momentum decile. Cramer makes two types
of recommendations during his show: “lightning round” recommendations and and “discussion segment”
recommendations. The former occur “on the spot” when viewers call to ask Cramer about the stock and
he responds by recommending they buy the stock. The latter are more in-depth recommendations that are
planned by Cramer before the show is filmed.
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Table 3: Average Abnormal Overnight Returns Following Cramer’s Recommendations
by 25 Size and BM Quintiles
(growth) (value)
Size / BM 1 2 3 4 5 Avg
(small) 1 8.02% 7.76% 3.52% 6.33% 5.85% 6.69%
2 4.78% 3.77% 1.92% 2.01% 2.07% 3.43%
3 1.96% 1.69% 2.46% 1.51% 2.07% 1.88%
4 1.20% 0.63% 1.52% 0.49% 3.36% 1.16%
(big) 5 0.71% 0.45% 0.63% 1.29% 0.51% 0.67%
Avg 3.93% 3.62% 2.31% 3.10% 2.82% 3.38%
Table 3: We report the average overnight abnormal returns following Cramer’s recommendations for each of
the twenty-five size and book-to-market portfolios. The (i, j) entry contains the average return for the stocks
in the ith size portfolio and the jth book-to-market portfolio. The right most entry in rows 1 through five
contain the average returns for the 5 size portfolios. The bottom entry in columns 1 through 5 contain the
average return for the 5 book-to-market portfolios. The bottom right entry, 3.38%, is the average overnight
abnormal return across all of the 331 stocks for which an abnormal overnight return can be computed.
Table 4: Abnormal Overnight Return by Momentum Decile
Decile Abnormal Return N









(Winners) 9 3.5% 70
Table 4: We report the average overnight abnormal returns following Cramer’s recommendations by momen-
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Analysis of Cramer’s Stock-Picking Ability, Entire Sample
Panel A: Portfolios Formed 1 Day after Recommendation
Hold Stocks 50 Days Hold Stocks 100 Days Hold Stocks 250 Days
Intercept -0.010 Intercept -0.009 Intercept -0.006
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004)
MktMinusRF 0.611 MktMinusRF 1.049** MktMinusRF 1.280***
(0.432) (0.369) (0.185)
SMB 1.398*** SMB 1.055*** SMB 0.635***
(0.375) (0.335) (0.129)
HML 0.347 HML 0.487 HML 0.250
(0.386) (0.421) (0.274)
Mom -0.401 Mom -0.350 Mom -0.011
(0.461) (0.343) (0.152)
Observations 11 Observations 13 Observations 20
R-Square 0.8832 R-Square 0.8482 R-Square 0.8768
Panel B: Portfolios Formed on Day of Recommendation
Hold Stocks 50 Days Hold Stocks 100 Days Hold Stocks 250 Days
Intercept 0.005 Intercept 0.005 Intercept 0.001
(0.008) (0.007) (0.004)
MktMinusRF 0.981** MktMinusRF 1.267*** MktMinusRF 1.431***
(0.427) (0.348) (0.187)
SMB 1.251** SMB 0.790** SMB 0.734***
(0.525) (0.269) (0.097)
HML 0.020 HML -0.047 HML 0.044
(0.480) (0.342) (0.226)
Mom -0.087 Mom 0.121 Mom 0.105
(0.270) (0.406) (0.163)
Observations 11 Observations 13 Observations 20
R-Square 0.8898 R-Square 0.9073 R-Square 0.9471
Table 6: We form long-only portfolios based on buy recommendations by Jim Cramer over our sample
period of November 16, 2005 and June 23, 2006. We compute equal-weighted daily excess returns from these
calendar-time portfolios and compound these daily returns to compute monthly returns. We then regress
the monthly returns against the Fama-French three factors and a momentum factor. The portfolio formation
strategies vary based on the waiting period (1 day or 0 days) and the holding period (50, 100 and 250 days).
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Table 7: Analysis of Cramer’s Stock-Picking Ability, No News
Panel A: Portfolios Formed 1 Day after Recommendation
Hold Stocks 50 Days Hold Stocks 100 Days Hold Stocks 250 Days
Intercept -0.011*** Intercept -0.012** Intercept -0.003
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
MktMinusRF 0.941*** MktMinusRF 0.943** MktMinusRF 1.124***
(0.184) (0.318) (0.142)
SMB 1.164*** SMB 0.937*** SMB 0.676***
(0.137) (0.171) (0.141)
HML -0.041 HML 0.070 HML -0.078
(0.158) (0.311) (0.195)
Mom -0.508*** Mom -0.152 Mom 0.115
(0.112) (0.284) (0.199)
Observations 11 Observations 13 Observations 20
R-Square 0.985 R-Square 0.884 R-Square 0.8994
Panel B: Portfolios Formed on Day of Recommendation
Hold Stocks 50 Days Hold Stocks 100 Days Hold Stocks 250 Days
Intercept 0.009 Intercept 0.007 Intercept 0.006
(0.009) (0.012) (0.005)
MktMinusRF 1.529** MktMinusRF 1.277* MktMinusRF 1.344***
(0.588) (0.637) (0.216)
SMB 0.903 SMB 0.536 SMB 0.811***
(0.538) (0.647) (0.199)
HML -0.553 HML -0.712 HML -0.382
(0.484) (0.709) (0.356)
Mom -0.034 Mom 0.535 Mom 0.287
(0.516) (0.650) (0.229)
Observations 11 Observations 13 Observations 20
R-Square 0.9084 R-Square 0.805 R-Square 0.8815
Table 7: As in Table 6, we form long-only portfolios based on buy recommendations by Jim Cramer over our
sample period of November 16, 2005 and June 23, 2006. In this table we restrict our sample to stocks that

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FIGURE 1. Market Response in the Hours Surrounding Cramer’s Recommendation 
 
We plot intraday returns on the day of Cramer’s recommendation.  Prices are based on recorded trades in the NASDAQ’a historical ITCH data feed, 
which includes after hours trades on INET.  Our sample consists of the 382 stocks with at least one trade on the ITCH data prior to 6 PM on the day 
of the recommendation.  We do not discard ADRs in the top figure because here we do not need to match the stocks to book to market portfolios.  
The 95% confidence interval is based on bootstrap sampling.  The bottom figure divides the stocks based on their NYSE size quintiles, and ADRs 





















































FIGURE 2. Intraday Returns sorted on News/No News and Discussion/Lightning Round 
 
In the top figure we plot intraday returns based on whether the stock had a news announcements in Factiva during the 3-day window surrounding 
Cramer’s recommendation.  The News sample consists of 187 stocks, and the No News sample consists of 195 stocks.  (ADRs are included.)   In the 














































FIGURE 3. Intraday Turnover 
 
We plot intraday turnover (scaled by 1,000) per thirty minute interval based on trading data from NASDAQ’s historical ITCH data feed, which includes 
after hours trading on INET.  Our sample consists of the 351 non-ADRs buy recommendations issued by Cramer.  The 95% bootstrap confidence 






































































































FIGURE 4. Market Response to Recommendations in Event Time 
 
We plot cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around Cramer’s recommendations in event time, where Day 0 is the day of the recommendation.  
Abnormal return on a given day is computed as the stock’s return minus its matched portfolio’s equal weighted return.  The top figure is based on the 
entire sample consisting of the 333 buy recommendations of non-ADRs that can be matched to size and book to market portfolios.  The bottom figure is 









































FIGURE 5. Market Response of Stocks with Others News and No Other News 
 
We plot CARs where the sample is divided based on whether the firm had a (non-Cramer related) news event or not. The “No News”  sample consists 
of 173 firms that had no news announcements in Factiva during the 3-day window surrounding Cramer’s recommendation.  The “News” sample 






















FIGURE 6. Turnover in Event Time 
 
We plot the stocks’ turnover, defined as trading volume divided by shares outstanding.  We scale turnover by 1,000.  The top figure consists of 351 
non-ADRs that can be matched to CRSP.  The 95% bootstrap confidence interval is plotted in dotted lines.  The bottom figure divides the stocks into 































































FIGURE 7. Short Turnover in Event Time 
 
We plot short turnover, defined as short sales volume divided by shares outstanding, in event time.  The short volume is taken from NYSE’s Reg 
SHO database.  Our measure of short turnover is scaled by 1,000 in the plots.  The top sample consists of the 175 non-ADRs recommended by 
Cramer that appear in the Reg SHO database, and the 95% bootstrap confidence interval is plotted in dotted lines.  The bottom sample is divided 
based on whether the stocks had a news announcements in Factiva during the 3 day window surrounding the recommendation.  The “News” sample 
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